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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
• The U.S. federal tax code provides large subsidies, 
in the form of tax breaks, for housing consumption.  
These tax breaks include the deductions for mort-
gage interest and property taxes, as well as the capital 
gains exclusion on home sale proﬁts.  Together, these 
tax breaks amount to $175 billion in foregone rev-
enues to the U.S. Treasury each year.
• For millions of families who struggle to afford a 
house, these tax breaks offer no relief at all.  Most 
personal income tax ﬁlers take the standard deduc-
tion, rather than itemizing deductions. Because most 
tax breaks are in the form of deductions, and the tax 
code has a progressive rate structure, the beneﬁts 
from housing tax breaks increase disproportionately 
with income.    
• Beneﬁts from the largest housing tax break, the 
deduction for mortgage interest, differ across met-
ropolitan areas and among income groups within 
metropolitan areas.  We ﬁnd the mortgage interest 
deduction overwhelmingly beneﬁts taxpayers earn-
ing more than $100,000 per year across all metropoli-
tan areas in our sample.  We also ﬁnd that major met-
ropolitan areas on the East and West coasts get the 
most tax relief from the mortgage interest deduction.
• Within metropolitan areas, beneﬁts from the 
mortgage interest deduction accrue almost entirely 
to taxpayers in suburban and exurban areas.  We 
demonstrate that the share of taxpayers beneﬁting 
from this deduction is in many cases 2 times as large 
in suburban areas as it is in inner city and inner ring 
suburbs.
• Taking the sum total of all tax breaks for housing, 
we ﬁnd they generate substantially different cost sav-
ings across metropolitan areas.  These cost savings do 
not result in higher homeownership rates, but instead 
in the purchase of larger, more expensive homes.  We 
estimate that houses today, depending on the metro-
politan area in question, are from 250 to 1,000 square 
feet larger than they otherwise would be, owing to 
the package of tax breaks.
• If increasing home ownership is to remain a goal 
of the federal government—and we are not convinced 
that it should be—then tax breaks for housing need to 
be reformed or eliminated.  To encourage homeown-
ership, federal housing subsidies should be more nar-
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rowly targeted to middle-income households buying 
inexpensive houses. With the congressional tax-writ-
ing committees hoping to accomplish comprehensive 
tax reform within the next year, housing tax breaks 
represent the best way to generate the revenue neces-
sary to push tax rates down.
INTRODUCTION
Since its inception a century ago, the individual income 
tax code has been exceedingly generous to homeowners. 
Homeowners may deduct the interest paid on up to $1 mil-
lion in mortgage loan debt; an additional $100,000 in debt 
backed by home equity; and state and local property taxes. 
The tax code also exempts nearly all capital gains from the 
sale of a primary residence from tax payments.1  
This paper examines the tax breaks for housing and has four 
central ﬁndings:
1. The value of the most noticeable and popular of 
these tax breaks, the mortgage interest deduction 
(MID), differs vastly across income groups and 
metropolitan areas.  For example, among Chicago 
taxpayers who earn less than $100,000, less than 25 
percent take the mortgage interest deduction and 
they save an average of $1,900 in taxes. Among tax-
payers who earn more than $100,000, 78 percent take 
the MID and, on average, their tax savings are 2.5 
times as large as those earning less than $100,000
2. The beneﬁts from the MID are heavily skewed 
toward suburban areas of major metropolitan 
areas, with the typical suburb having between 1.5 
and 2 times the share of taxpayers claiming the 
deduction.  
3. The total package of housing tax breaks greatly 
reduces the cost of consuming housing, but does 
so unevenly across metropolitan areas.  Tax breaks 
reduce the annual cost of owning a home by more 
than $10,000 in places like Los Angeles, but by less 
than $2,000 in Atlanta.  
4. The cost reduction caused by housing tax breaks 
does little to induce homeownership, but instead 
1. Internal Revenue Service regulations state that the exclusion is allowed for owners 
who use a home as their “main home” for a total of two of the last ﬁve years prior 
to sale.  The regulation also makes clear that in cases of split residency throughout a 
calendar year, there is only one primary residence to which the exclusion applies.  In 
cases where residence is split across multiple years, for example two years of consis-
tent residency in one home followed by two years of consistency in another home, 
the exclusion can apply to both homes as long as they are not sold in the same two 
year period.  IRS publication 523 provides complete deﬁnitions and details on the 
capital gains exclusion.     
contributes to the building of larger, McMansion-
style homes.2  We estimate that houses today are 
between 250 and 1,000 square feet larger than they 
otherwise would be, owing to the package of tax 
breaks. This is because the deductions are claimed 
overwhelming by upper-income tax ﬁlers, who are 
not on the margin between owning and renting a 
home. Instead, the size of the tax breaks help them 
decide how much extra space to purchase or build.
Proponents of housing tax breaks liken homeownership to 
apple pie and the American ﬂag, arguing that homeowner-
ship leads to greater community engagement and a plethora 
of other socially desirable behaviors. Without the tax breaks, 
proponents argue, millions of Americans who currently are 
homeowners would otherwise be unable to purchase a home. 
This argument has two ﬂaws. The notion that homeown-
ership induces salutary behaviors – rather than it simply 
being the case that such habits are correlated with having 
the wherewithal to buy a house – is a dubious proposition, 
more wishful thinking than accepted wisdom.  An even big-
ger problem facing apologists for the current system is that 
the existing tax breaks do almost nothing to increase home-
ownership. Instead, they mostly serve to encourage people 
who already have the ﬁnancial means to buy a house to pur-
chase larger homes and take on more debt. The ability to 
deduct mortgage interest and property taxes, in fact, gives 
very little to a middle-class family who would otherwise be 
on the margin of affording to buy a home.
A major ﬂaw in the design of existing homeownership incen-
tives is that most are tax deductions, which by deﬁnition are 
more valuable to those who face higher marginal tax rates. 
A progressive tax code like our current system, where mar-
ginal rates on income range from 10 percent to nearly 40 
percent, means that people who pay only the lowest marginal 
tax rates receive relatively modest savings from any deduc-
tions. High-income households who pay on income earned 
in the top tax brackets receive a much bigger break. 
It isn’t just the tax code’s progressivity that skews housing 
tax breaks’ beneﬁts toward the wealthy; the fact that house-
holds can deduct interest on a mortgage as large as $1 million 
means that nearly all homeowners are able to deduct every 
dime of the mortgage interest they pay from their taxable 
income, even the very wealthy.
The high deductibility limit and the tax code’s progressivity 
result in the beneﬁts from the mortgage interest deduction 
being widely skewed across the country, both geographically 
and across income groups.  Homeowners in wealthy com-
2. Other contributing factors to the McMansion phenomena are rising incomes and 
the building of transportation infrastructure (especially interstate highways) connect-
ing areas with cheap land to employment centers.   
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munities with high housing costs—mainly in the suburbs 
of major metropolitan areas on the East and West coasts—
receive tax beneﬁts much larger than those living in less 
expensive inner-city neighborhoods or in smaller commu-
nities in the middle of the country, where housing prices are 
more modest.  
To give just one example of the discrepancy in tax beneﬁts, 
the average homeowner in the San Francisco area receives 
an annual reduction in the cost of home ownership of more 
than $12,000 a year from the package of tax beneﬁts avail-
able in the federal tax code. By contrast, the average savings 
to a home-owning family in Flint, Mich. is barely more than 
$500. 
HOW MUCH DO HOUSING TAX BREAKS COST 
THE TREASURY?
While surveys invariably show that among the public’s 
complaints about the tax code complexity is chief, the real-
ity is that, for most people ﬁling an income tax return, the 
process is relatively straightforward. Less than one-third 
of taxpayers take the trouble to keep track of the various 
deductions the code allows for and to put those down on 
their returns through the process of “itemizing.” 3 Those 
who choose not to itemize generally avail themselves of the 
standard deduction, which is $12,200 for married couples, 
and then proceed to report a few facts about their income 
and family and be done with it.
For middle-class families, the standard deduction is usually 
the optimal option, since it constitutes a sizeable fraction of 
their income. It would take a lot of spending on tax-deduct-
ible goods and services to have itemized deductions that 
exceed the optional standard deduction. For a fairly modest 
$200,000, 30-year amortized mortgage loan with an inter-
est rate of 4 percent, the tax-deductible interest payments in 
the ﬁrst year would be only $8,000, and the proportion of the 
loan payment schedule that is comprised of interest would 
decline gradually in each successive year.  If we assume this 
family faces a property tax of 1 percent and gives 2 percent 
of its income to charity—roughly the national averages for 
each—then the three largest deductions in the code for this 
prototypical household sum to the standard deduction. In 
other words, this household does not save anything on its 
taxes from purchasing a house.  And for the 90 percent of all 
households with an income of less than $146,400 – the upper 
threshold for the 25% tax bracket – each dollar above the 
standard deduction reduces their federal tax bill by a mere 
25 cents, at most. 
 
3. The latest available IRS data show that 46.2 million tax ﬁlers itemized deductions in 
2011, or roughly 32 percent of the total of 145.3 million tax returns.
Because the U.S. income tax code is progressive, with rates 
rising with income, deductions provide more tax savings 
to higher-income households.  For instance, a household 
earning an income of $70,000, which is in the 15 percent tax 
bracket, would see a tax savings of $1,200 from a $200,000, 
4 percent mortgage. A family with an income of $500,000 
would save nearly $3,000 in taxes, or two and a half times 
more than the household in the 15 percent tax bracket.
Of course, the tax rate differential is not the only factor driv-
ing the difference in tax beneﬁts between the middle class 
and the wealthy. The fact that upper-income households 
have bigger and more expensive homes further exacerbates 
the difference in tax beneﬁts from homeownership. Income 
differences and housing differences combine to have a mul-
tiplicative impact. A doubling of income more than doubles 
the expected tax savings from the mortgage interest deduc-
tion, as it boosts the family into higher tax bracket as well 
as proportionally increasing the amount they can borrow to 
purchase a home. 
A household with an income of $500,000 can afford a $1 
million mortgage, while a family earning near the national 
median income of $51,000 would struggle to afford more 
than twenty percent of that.  But the tax code awards the 
$500,000 household with the large mortgage a much larger 
subsidy.  For this family, a $1 million dollar mortgage at 4 per-
cent interest results in a tax savings of nearly $16,000 a year, 
or more than 10 times that of the family with the national 
median income who borrow the cost of an average house 
($212,000). 
All of these savings for borrowers add up to big bills for the 
Treasury.  The cost of the tax beneﬁts for owner-occupied 
housing sum to $175 billion per annum,4  with the mortgage 
interest deduction alone costing the U.S. Treasury roughly 
$100 billion each year.  The ﬁve-year estimates for these tax 
beneﬁts sum to well over $1 trillion.
FEDERAL TAX BENEFITS FOR HOUSING DIFFER 
ACROSS THE COUNTRY
Because tax beneﬁts depend on housing costs and income, 
the value of tax breaks vary widely across metropolitan areas, 
as incomes and home prices differ substantially across the 
country. Incomes and home prices tend to be higher around 
major metropolitan areas—especially the suburbs—and 
along the East and West coasts, while the close-in neighbor-
hoods and inner-ring suburbs5 of most major cities, as well as 
4. Not included in the $175 billion is the exclusion of imputed rent from taxable 
income, estimated to reduce revenues by $50 billion annually.
5. Puentes and Orﬁeld (2002) examine the economic environment of inner-ring 
suburbs and report that although they are heterogeneous across metropolitan 
areas, they often have older housing and infrastructure and depreciated commercial 
areas.  These facts, along with lower than average incomes, all contribute to the small 
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TABLE 1: TAX SAVINGS FROM MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION BETWEEN INCOME GROUPS  
(REPRESENTATIVE CITIES)
% with MID 
benefit
Average Tax 
Savings for 
MID Filers
% with MID 
benefit
Average Tax 
Savings for 
MID Filers
Large Metros
Atlanta, GA 28.62% $1,794 84.76% $4,894
Boston, MA 21.49% $2,101 77.47% $5,068
Chicago, IL 24.71% $1,918 78.40% $4,819
Dallas- Fort Worth, TX 18.00% $1,474 73.60% $4,004
Denver, CO 29.32% $2,199 82.73% $5,183
Detroit, MI 26.34% $1,582 80.40% $4,053
Houston, TX 15.84% $1,428 67.69% $3,538
Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA 19.02% $3,210 74.97% $7,548
Minneapolis-Saint Paul, MN 31.49% $1,946 84.87% $4,528
New York City, NY 16.80% $2,160 70.72% $5,346
Philadelphia, PA-NJ 23.25% $1,616 80.35% $4,316
Phoenix, AZ 28.38% $2,417 81.92% $5,849
San Francisco- Oakland, CA 20.40% $3,667 72.40% $8,039
Seattle, WA 25.64% $2,541 77.01% $5,716
Washington, DC-MD-VA 27.65% $2,815 82.83% $6,101
Small Metros
Austin, TX 20.13% $1,603 73.11% $4,142
Baton Rouge, LA 15.65% $1,449 68.51% $3,343
Chattanooga, TN-GA 17.07% $1,411 67.61% $3,989
El Paso, TX 10.26% $1,075 62.88% $3,209
Erie, PA 14.05% $1,063 67.17% $2,747
Flint, MI 22.04% $1,345 77.66% $3,180
Fresno, CA 18.73% $2,238 79.86% $5,105
Peoria, IL 16.47% $1,186 65.97% $2,908
Salinas-Seaside-Monterey, CA 19.59% $3,691 71.95% $7,790
Wichita, KS 18.77% $1,157 74.41% $2,723
Tax Filers with <$100K AGI Tax Filers with >$100K AGI
Large metros are chosen to be geographically representative among areas with a population over 3 
mill ion.  Smaller metros are chosen to be geographically representative among areas with a 
population under 1.5 mill ion.   
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the more rural regions of the country, tend to have incomes 
and home prices that are lower. 
Incidentally, the difference in housing prices across the 
country are driven not just by differences in demand, but 
also differences in supply. In places like New York, Califor-
nia, and the Maryland suburbs of Washington, D.C., various 
regulatory restrictions make building houses more expen-
sive, something Harvard economist Ed Glaeser has amply 
documented.6 
To quantify how the impact of housing tax breaks differ 
across various regions of the country, we used a ZIP code 
level Internal Revenue Service data ﬁle that contains infor-
mation on average income, how many tax ﬁlers claim the 
mortgage interest deduction, and how much was deducted. 
From this information, we can calculate the tax savings from 
taking the deduction.  We incorporated local housing market 
data from the American Housing Survey on property taxes, 
debt ﬁnancing, and self-reported home values with the IRS 
data to measure how the reductions in the cost of owning a 
 beneﬁt these areas receive from housing tax beneﬁts.
6. See for example, Glaeser and Ward (2009) that examines land use regulations in 
eastern Massachusetts and Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saks (2005) that make this point 
using data from Manhattan.   
home differ as a result of the tax code across metropolitan 
areas.7  
The data show that the tax savings that accrue from the MID 
are highly skewed both across metropolitan areas and across 
income groups within the same metropolitan area. They also 
vary between central city and suburban locations within a 
metro area.  
The differences across income groups are enormous.  In most 
cities, tax ﬁlers with an income greater than $100,000 are 
between three and four times more likely to take the mort-
gage interest deduction than taxpayers below that thresh-
old.  The average tax savings for high-income households 
are more than double those of the lower-income cohort. 
Generally, the suburban areas of major metros have a larger 
percentage of tax ﬁlers that beneﬁt from the MID, but the 
average tax savings in these areas is only slightly larger than 
in central cities.  Looking at the combined beneﬁt of all hous-
ing tax breaks shows that these beneﬁts barely beneﬁt some 
smaller cities in the form of reduced housing costs, while 
residents of large metro areas on the coasts save well into 
ﬁve ﬁgures annually. 
7. See the appendix for a full explanation of the model and data sources.
FIGURE 1: % BENEFITING BY AGI ACROSS LARGE METROS
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Notes: Percentages of ﬁlers with mortgage interest deduction are categorized into two adjusted gross income (AGI) groups: <$100K 
and >$100K imply an AGI less than or greater than $100,000, respectively. 
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TAX SAVINGS ACROSS METRO AREAS AND 
INCOME GROUPS
Table 1 shows average tax savings for 15 representative 
large metropolitan areas, and ten small metropolitan areas 
(the appendix contains this information for all metro areas in 
the data),8 with the beneﬁciaries split into two groups: those 
above $100,000 of income and those below.  The most reveal-
ing datum from the table is how few tax ﬁlers earning below 
$100,000 beneﬁt from the MID, regardless of metro area. For 
example, Minneapolis has by far the most tax ﬁlers earning 
below $100,000 who take the MID, at 31.5%, but even there, 
the gap between tax ﬁlers under and over $100,000 in AGI 
is large, as nearly 85 percent of tax ﬁlers earning more than 
$100,000 beneﬁt from the MID. About 25 percent of tax-
payers earning under $100,000 take the mortgage interest 
deduction.
Houston has the smallest percentage of tax filers under 
$100,000 that beneﬁt from the MID, with just under 16 per-
cent receive any tax savings, while more than four times 
that proportion of taxpayers in Houston earning more than 
$100,000 beneﬁt from the deduction.   The share of tax ﬁlers 
that beneﬁt from the MID and earn more than $100,000 is 
between three and four times larger than those earning less 
than $100,000 in most cities.  
8. We chose large and small metropolitan areas to be geographically representative.  
Large metro areas are chosen among areas with a population over 3 million.  Small 
metro areas are chosen from areas with a population under 1.5 million.
Smaller metropolitan areas show a similar—albeit slightly 
less disparate—distribution of beneﬁts as larger metropoli-
tan areas. While vast differences persist in the proportion 
of those claiming MID between cohorts above and below 
the $100,000 threshold, those earning less than $100,000 are 
even less likely to receive a beneﬁt in smaller metros.  For 
instance, just over 10 percent of tax ﬁlers in El Paso, Texas 
earning less than $100,000 take the mortgage interest deduc-
tion, while nearly 63 percent earning over $100,000 do so.  
In addition to large differences in the share of tax ﬁlers above 
and below the $100,000 threshold beneﬁting from the MID, 
there are also substantial differences in how much money 
each group saves. For instance, residents of the San Francis-
co-Oakland metro area who earn more than $100,000 save 
$8,000 a year from the MID, more than double what resi-
dents who earn less than $100,000 save.  The tax savings for 
higher-income residents is more than double the savings of 
lower-income residents for every metro area we examine.
A similar gap between the tax beneﬁts of upper-income and 
lower-income taxpayers exists in smaller metropolitan areas 
as well, with upper-income taxpayers saving between two 
and three times the tax payments that lower-income resi-
dents save.  The difference in average tax savings between 
income groups can be attributed both to higher marginal tax 
rates, which result in each dollar deducted from a higher-
income ﬁler’s income creating relatively greater savings, and 
to the fact that upper income taxpayers have 60  percent more 
FIGURE 2: TAX SAVINGS BY AGI ACROSS LARGE METROS
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Notes: Percentages of ﬁlers with mortgage interest deduction are categorized into two adjusted gross income (AGI) groups: <$100K 
and >$100K imply an AGI less than or greater than $100,000, respectively. 
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mortgage interest to deduct. Their higher relative incomes 
allow them to purchase more expensive homes and thus take 
on larger loans.   
THE MID BENEFITS SUBURBS MORE THAN  
THE CITIES
In most major metropolitan areas, the percentage of sub-
urban residents that beneﬁt from the MID is much greater 
than in the central city, owing to the fact that housing prices 
and incomes tend to be higher in the suburbs.  This differ-
ence is the largest in Detroit, where twice the proportion of 
suburbanites claim the deduction as compared to central city 
residents.  In cities such as Boston, Dallas, Denver, Minneap-
olis, Phoenix, San Francisco and Washington, D.C, suburban 
residents are 50 percent more likely to claim the MID than 
central city residents, with that ratio being slightly higher in 
Atlanta, Chicago, Houston, Los Angeles, and Philadelphia.  
While suburban taxpayers are more likely to claim the MID 
than those living in the central city, the average savings for 
taxpayers who do claim the deduction are roughly the same. 
The difference in tax savings as a result of the MID are with-
in $100 for Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Houston and Washing-
ton, and even in metro areas with the greatest disparities— 
such as Detroit, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Phoenix and San 
 Francisco—they remain within $850.  The similarities in 
average tax savings between central city and suburban resi-
dents likely reﬂect similar marginal tax rates, and generally 
similar home values across the metropolitan area. While 
wealthy people do live in cities, so do less-wealthy families 
who don’t own a home or who have a mortgage and income 
level too small to avail themselves of the MID.
Figure 3.1 shows how residents of representative metropoli-
tan areas (Houston, Boston, Phoenix and Washington) claim 
the MID.  The pattern of relatively sparse claims near the 
central city and inner-ring residential areas, compared to a 
much larger percentage of tax ﬁlers in suburban enclaves 
and exurbs, is apparent in all four cities to varying degrees. 
Houston is the classic example, and representative of many 
sun-belt cities, showing next to no MID claims in inner-city 
areas and inner-ring suburbs inside of the beltline freeway 
system, and an abundance of claims just outside and in the 
exurb areas.  Also noticeable from these maps is that, while 
inner-city areas in D.C. and Boston have a relative dearth of 
MID claims compared to their own suburbs, in many cases, 
these areas still beneﬁt as much as the suburbs of Houston 
and Phoenix. 
Although less stark than the difference in the percentage 
of tax ﬁlers claiming, Figure 3.2 shows the difference in the 
% with MID 
benefit
Average Tax 
Savings for 
MID Filers
% with MID 
benefit
Average Tax 
Savings for 
MID Filers
Large Metros
Atlanta, GA 24.05% $2,189 39.20% $2,221
Boston, MA 23.84% $2,639 36.51% $2,669
Chicago, IL 21.27% $2,362 36.70% $2,363
Dallas- Fort Worth, TX 19.20% $1,627 30.08% $1,941
Denver, CO 29.41% $2,317 46.66% $3,012
Detroit, MI 17.97% $1,200 37.04% $2,054
Houston, TX 14.28% $1,745 25.72% $1,719
Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA 17.04% $3,261 30.06% $3,978
Minneapolis-Saint Paul, MN 32.01% $2,085 45.18% $2,521
New York City, NY 15.06% $2,460 31.38% $2,790
Philadelphia, PA-NJ 22.49% $1,491 37.25% $2,302
Phoenix, AZ 28.16% $2,427 42.08% $3,229
San Francisco- Oakland, CA 24.15% $4,195 37.65% $4,894
Seattle, WA 30.42% $3,048 38.25% $3,122
Washington, DC-MD-VA 30.92% $3,191 44.72% $3,707
Central Cities Suburbs
TABLE 2: TAX SAVINGS FROM MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION BETWEEN  
CENTRAL CITY AND SUBURBAN RESIDENTS (REPRESENTATIVE CITIES)
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FIGURE 3.1: ZOOMED-IN METROS: HOUSTON, PHOENIX, D.C., BOSTON
FIGURE 3.2: ZOOMED-IN METROS: HOUSTON, PHOENIX, D.C., BOSTON
Source: Internal Revenue Service SOI Individual Income Tax return data from 2007. The breaks shown in the legend using the Jenks 
natural breaks classiﬁcation method.
Source: Internal Revenue Service SOI Individual Income Tax return data from 2007. The breaks shown in the legend using the Jenks 
natural breaks classiﬁcation method.
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average MID claim amount across representative metropoli-
tan areas (Houston, Boston, Phoenix and Washington).  This 
ﬁgure shows that, while the average beneﬁt is mostly ﬂat 
across a given metropolitan area, each city has areas with 
much higher average claims, heading northwest from the 
capital in D.C. for example, or west-southwest from down-
town Houston.  These ﬁgures make that point that, even 
though the inner-metropolitan distribution of beneﬁts from 
housing tax breaks is substantial, the intra-metropolitan dis-
tribution adds to the skewedness of these beneﬁts.  
HOW DO HOUSING TAX BENEFITS IMPACT THE 
HOUSING MARKET?  
Although the MID is the costliest housing tax break in the 
code, the deduction for property tax payments and the exclu-
sion of capital gains from the sale of a home also reduce tax 
revenue by tens of billions of dollars.  As with our analysis of 
the MID, most of the tax beneﬁts for these other housing tax 
breaks go to wealthier ﬁlers who live in suburbs.
A look across large metro areas shows that the annual cost 
Standard Annual 
Home Owning Cost
Annual Home 
Owning Cost with 
Tax Preferences
Large Metros
Atlanta, GA $17,627 $15,999
Boston, MA $18,033 $11,677
Chicago, IL $19,479 $15,345
Dallas- Fort Worth, TX $13,759 $10,853
Denver, CO $17,935 $15,191
Detroit, MI $18,318 $16,720
Houston, TX $12,662 $9,291
Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA $13,471 $2,819
Minneapolis-Saint Paul, MN $19,843 $17,564
New York City, NY $18,915 $8,469
Philadelphia, PA-NJ $11,264 $5,745
Phoenix, AZ $14,423 $11,785
San Francisco- Oakland, CA $37,647 $25,373
Seattle, WA $19,112 $12,771
Washington, DC-MD-VA $11,464 $2,249
Small Metros
Austin, TX $17,555 $11,967
Baton Rouge, LA $9,530 $6,508
Chattanooga, TN-GA $10,882 $8,933
El Paso, TX $7,606 $5,486
Erie, PA $6,107 $4,759
Flint, MI $7,117 $6,588
Fresno, CA $15,432 $13,424
Peoria, IL $11,457 $9,445
Salinas-Seaside-Monterey, CA $25,625 $22,706
Wichita, KS $8,830 $7,255
Large metros are chosen to be geographically representative among areas with a 
population over 3 mill ion.  Smaller metros are chosen to be geographically 
representative among areas with a population under 1.5 mill ion.   
TABLE 3: ANNUAL COST OF HOUSING SAVINGS FROM TAX EXPENDITURES
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of owning a home varies widely.  The lowest cost among 
the metro areas in Table 3 is Philadelphia, with an average 
annual cost of homeownership just over $11,000, while San 
Francisco-Oakland homeowners spend $37,600 annually.  
In some instances, disentangling this particular piece of data 
can be complicated. For instance, the annual cost of owner-
ship is quite low in Washington, because homeowners carry 
relatively little debt, while in Houston, another low-cost city, 
it is driven by low housing prices, the result of a vast supply 
of buildable land in the metro area and an uncommon lack 
of regulatory interference to build on that land.  
Differences in income tax rates,9 debt-to-value ratios, prop-
erty taxes and local home price inﬂation all contribute to the 
tax beneﬁts to owner-occupied housing. Each have differing 
effects on the annual cost of homeownership.  Table 3 shows 
that the difference in the discount offered by housing tax 
expenditures varies widely across metro areas.  In Atlanta 
– where marginal tax rates are relatively low, few residents 
claim the MID and property tax deductions and home prices 
have been tame – homeowners beneﬁt relatively little.  On 
the other hand, families in Washington have higher incomes 
9. Our model uses only differences in income tax rates that come from income differ-
ences across areas.  Income differences create income tax differences because of the 
progressive federal income tax. 
than in Atlanta, which means they face higher tax rates and 
are more likely to take the housing deductions. Combined 
with the steady increase in home prices throughout the D.C. 
area, the various housing tax breaks save D.C. homeowners 
more than $9,000 a year, while saving Atlanta homeown-
ers only about $1,600.  In New York, San Francisco and Los 
Angeles, average annual savings exceed $10,000. 
Homeowners in smaller communities beneﬁt less from hous-
ing tax breaks than people who live in bigger cities, owing to 
lower incomes and home prices.  Residents of Austin, Texas 
have an average annual savings that exceeds $5,000, the larg-
est of the smaller metros in the data.  The only other commu-
nity within this cohort whose average beneﬁt is greater than 
$3,000 was Baton Rouge, La.  Even homeowners in Salinas, 
Calif., where home prices remain relatively high, save rela-
tively little from the tax breaks. 
The average cost savings in smaller metropolitan areas is 
also driven by a narrower income distribution. Even though 
there are high claim rates for tax ﬁlers earning more than 
$100,000 in these areas, there’s relatively fewer of them in 
small communities. In communities where incomes are low 
and housing prices have plummeted, very few people have 
much to gain from deviating from the standard deduction. At 
FIGURE 4: ANNUAL COST OF HOUSING - SAVING FROM TAX EXPENDITURES
Source: Authors’ calculations 
Notes: Annual cost of housing savings from tax expenditures includes deductions for both mortgage interest and property taxes 
as well as the elimination of capital gains taxation.
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the bottom end of the distribution, homeowners who itemize 
their taxes in Flint, Mich., and Erie, Pa., save an average of 
less than $1,500 a year.
The tax code does not adjust for different costs of living 
across the country: a $300,000 annual income could make 
someone feel rich in Peoria, Ill. but staunchly middle class 
in Manhattan. The MID effectively adjusts for cost-of-liv-
ing differences by giving people in high-cost areas a bigger 
break, albeit along with wealthy people in low-cost areas as 
well. 
At the same time, housing tax breaks also inﬂuence where 
people choose to live. Fewer people would leave the hinter-
lands for the big city if it weren’t for the fact that the tax 
code can reduce their effective cost of buying a home once 
they get there.   
THE TAX CODE CREATED MCMANSIONS
The one tangible result of the MID that is beyond dispute 
is that it has resulted in larger, more expensive homes. This 
is a result inimical to economic growth: if society allocates 
Current Average 
Home Size (square 
feet)
Estimated Average 
Home Size with No Tax 
Preferences (square 
feet)
Large Metros
Atlanta, GA 2654 2350
Boston, MA 2221 1487
Chicago, IL 2359 1819
Dallas- Fort Worth, TX 2383 1839
Denver, CO 2215 1824
Detroit, MI 2408 2146
Houston, TX 2345 1709
Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA 2059 977
Minneapolis-Saint Paul, MN 1979 1705
New York City, NY 1927 1087
Philadelphia, PA-NJ 2527 1499
Phoenix, AZ 2094 1667
San Francisco- Oakland, CA 2051 1408
Seattle, WA 2168 1480
Washington, DC-MD-VA 2689 1265
Small Metros
Austin, TX 2290 1584
Baton Rouge, LA 3121 2162
Chattanooga, TN-GA 2089 1670
El Paso, TX 1621 1166
Erie, PA 1800 1375
Flint, MI 1447 1311
Fresno, CA 2042 1728
Peoria, IL 2471 1984
Salinas-Seaside-Monterey, CA 2014 1737
Wichita, KS 1989 1591
Large metros are chosen to be geographically representative among areas with a 
population over 3 mill ion.  Smaller metros are chosen to be geographically 
representative among areas with a population under 1.5 mill ion.   
TABLE 4: AVERAGE HOME SIZE PURCHASE - WITH AND WITHOUT TAX EXPENDITURES
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more capital to construct larger houses, it means there is less 
money available for companies to invest expanding proﬁt-
able operations. 
There is nothing wrong with people choosing to spend more 
of their wealth on housing, or for them to move up to a bigger 
house as their income grows. To some degree, the fact that 
we live in nicer and larger homes than a generation or two 
ago is a manifestation of the gradual increase in income for 
the middle class. But there is no reason for the government 
to provide ﬁnancial encouragement for people to buy bigger 
and better homes. Moreover, there is substantial evidence 
that the decades-long increase in the size of the average U.S. 
house owes more to insipid tax policy than to our growing 
wealth. 
HOW MUCH DOES THE TAX CODE INCREASE 
HOUSING SIZE?
Economists have shown that home purchasers are 
quite sensitive to tax-induced changes in the annual cost of 
home ownership, but not in the ways lobbyists of the hous-
ing industry tend to claim.  When the tax beneﬁts to hous-
ing increase, we don’t see more people buying homes but 
instead, people buy bigger homes.
Table 4 shows both the current distribution of home sizes (in 
square footage) across metropolitan areas, and our estimate 
for how different the average size of homes would be without 
tax preferences for housing.  These estimates are based on 
how strongly home buyers react to the cost reduction from 
housing tax preferences.
In some areas with large homes, like Atlanta, the estimated 
effect is small.  The current average size of a single-family 
dwelling in Atlanta is about 2,650 square feet, only slightly 
larger than our estimates show would be the case in this mar-
ket if not for tax beneﬁts.  In other areas, like Los Angeles, the 
tax expenditures are pushing the purchase of homes that are 
more than double what our estimates suggest would be, if not 
for the generous tax breaks afforded to home buyers.  The 
inducement to buy larger homes is also apparent in smaller 
metropolitan areas, although to a smaller extent, with most 
of these areas experiencing about a 400-square-foot bump 
in average home size.  
The map below displays the difference between actual aver-
age home sizes and our estimates of how homes would be 
sized in markets without tax breaks.  Across the country, 
housing tax breaks contribute to larger homes.  The effect is 
most noticeable in Washington, D.C., Philadelphia and Los 
Angeles, where the average home size is more than 1,000 
FIGURE 5: DIFFERENCE IN HOME SIZE DUE TO HOUSING TAX EXPENDITURES
Source: Estimates of increased square footage from Hanson (2012) 
Notes: Additional average home size is measured in square footage by tax expenditure savings including deductions for both 
mortgage interest and property taxes as well as the elimination of capital gains taxation.
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square feet larger than we estimate that it would have been 
in the absence of favored treatment for housing.  While still 
inducing signiﬁcant changes in the size of home purchased, 
the magnitude of difference in home size is smaller for Mid-
western and Southern cities, which is largely driven by a 
smaller propensity of residents in these regions to use the 
deduction.   
Differences in the size home that residents choose as a 
result of tax breaks are driven by the fact that the breaks 
make housing cheaper to purchase on the margin. This effect 
is magniﬁed in areas with higher incomes, as the discount 
afforded to those in the top tax brackets results in an even 
larger cost reduction from deductions.  On top of this, the 
capital gains exclusion ensures that a growing amount of 
income from the sale of a home will be earned tax free, mak-
ing the tax breaks especially valuable in hot housing markets 
like San Francisco.
The graphic below shows a strong correlation between the 
cost reduction from housing tax breaks and the resulting 
increase in home size, using data from 120 metropolitan 
areas across the United States.  Where housing tax breaks 
offer the largest reduction in cost, the metro areas tend to 
have the largest estimated increases in size relative to how 
large houses would have been in the absence of these breaks. 
Cities in the Northeast (New York, Philadelphia, Washing-
ton, D.C.) and California (San Francisco, Los Angeles, San 
Jose) are well represented in the tail of the ﬁgure, showing 
both large cost reductions and larger-than-expected homes. 
This is not to say that places like New York or San Francisco 
have especially large homes. They do not. Rather, our conclu-
sion is that they would have even smaller homes, on average, 
if not for the associated tax breaks.
The question that naturally arises when thinking about how 
housing tax breaks change buyers’ decisions is, “doesn’t the 
cost reduction from these tax breaks also encourage home-
ownership?”  The answer is a resounding “no,” a conclu-
sion that is conﬁrmed by numerous empirical studies, as 
well as a look at the design of the incentives themselves.10 
The size of the standard deduction makes most of the tax 
breaks useless to most homeowners.  Those who do claim 
the deductions are upper-income tax ﬁlers, who are not on 
the margin between owning and renting a home. Rather, the 
choices they face include the number of bedrooms, whether 
to demand a ﬁnished basement or a home with more elabo-
rate ﬁxtures on a larger lot.   
WHAT MIGHT A REAL HOMEOWNERSHIP POLICY 
LOOK LIKE?
Let us grant the assumption that homeownership does 
convey tangible societal beneﬁts that make it worthy of some 
10. Glaeser and Shapiro (2003) ﬁnd no correlation between generosity of the mort-
gage interest deduction and homeownership rates using national time series data.  
Hanson (2012) ﬁnds no correlation between mortgage interest deduction policies at 
the state level and homeownership rates.
FIGURE 6:  CORRELATION BETWEEN HOUSING COST CHANGE AND HOME SIZE CHANGE
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form of government policy preference. What would a policy 
designed to encourage ownership look like, if we were start-
ing from scratch?
For starters, there would be no government tax breaks or 
subsidies available to the wealthy, who can easily afford 
houses without such incentives. The amount of the subsidy 
would not be tied to the size of the mortgage, either, and 
most of the subsidy would be received immediately, when 
the aspiring middle-class homeowners are young and pre-
sumably earning less than in subsequent years. 
It doesn’t take a team of economists to arrive at these pre-
cepts. A number of states have their own homeownership 
incentive programs that attempt to do precisely this. These 
programs also differ from the plethora of tax breaks at the 
federal level by being less expensive, while also much more 
effective at helping people buy houses.
For example, the Wisconsin Housing and Economic Devel-
opment Authority (WHEDA) offers assistance to ﬁrst-time 
home buyers with an income below approximately $90,000 
who are purchasing a home that costs less than $250,000. 
The program substantially defrays closing costs, which can 
be a serious impediment to buying a home for young fami-
lies who have not had time to accumulate signiﬁcant savings. 
WHEDA assistance is provided in the form of low-interest 
loans, which are recouped by wrapping them into the mort-
gage payment. On net, the program costs the state nearly 
nothing. Wisconsin’s home ownership rate is 70 percent, 
more than ﬁve percentage points higher than the national 
average, even though the median income in the state is below 
the national average.
Common sense reforms to the current package of federal tax 
breaks for housing have been proposed from both sides of the 
political aisle.  President George W. Bush’s tax reform panel, 
as well as President Barack Obama’s National Commission 
on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, both have recommend-
ed scaling back housing’s tax-preferred status.  These plans 
both recommend capping the size of mortgage that qualiﬁes 
for subsidy.  They both recommend eliminating the deduct-
ibility of mortgage interest in favor of a tax credit, which 
would limit the subsidy to upper-income taxpayers, while 
simultaneously expanding it at the lower end of the income 
distribution.  Other intermediate steps toward using subsidy 
dollars to encourage ownership could include eliminating 
tax breaks on anything but a primary residence and limiting 
the amount of housing capital gains exempt from taxation.    
In an era when entitlement costs threaten to balloon the fed-
eral budget deﬁcit beyond the mere $1 trillion of recent years, 
sacriﬁcing $150 billion a year to a tax break that utterly fails 
at achieving its ostensible goal and gives the preponderance 
of its beneﬁts to the well-off is a luxury the federal govern-
ment can no longer afford. 
The nomenclatura of Washington D.C. recognize this as 
well. Few bother to put forward a policy rationale for keep-
ing housing-related deductions in the tax code. Instead, they 
protest that the immense power of the lobbies that bene-
ﬁt from these breaks are reason enough not to even bother 
spending the immense political capital necessary to ﬁx the 
problem.
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APPENDIX: METHOD OF QUANTIFYING THE TAX 
BENEFITS OF OWNER-OCCUPIED HOUSING
The U.S. income tax code offers several provisions that 
favor owner-occupied housing.  The largest of these are the 
mortgage interest deduction ($640 billion, FY 2014-2018); 
the exclusion of imputed rental income ($437 billion, FY 
2014-2018); the exclusion of capital gains on home sales 
($263 billion, FY 2014-2018); and the deductibility of state 
and local property taxes ($137 billion, FY 2014-1018).11  While 
homeowners beneﬁt by not counting imputed rent or gains 
from the sale of a home as taxable income, the mortgage 
interest and property tax deduction beneﬁts accrue only to 
tax ﬁlers who itemize deductions.  Given the rise in the stan-
dard deduction, and several years of historically low mort-
gage interest rates, only about a third of the tax-ﬁling popula-
tion itemizes deductions.
Both the mortgage interest and property tax deductions 
work the same way.  They are line items on a tax return that 
reduce the amount of income subject to tax.  Because the 
U.S. income tax code has a graduated rate structure (mar-
ginal rates rise with income), deductions provide more tax 
savings to those at the upper part of the income distribu-
tion.  Consider two tax ﬁlers both paying $5,000 in mort-
gage interest, one in the top bracket (39.6 percent) and the 
other in the bottom bracket (10 percent).  The taxes saved 
because of the MID for the top-bracket ﬁler are $1,980, and 
only $500 for the bottom-bracket ﬁler.  In reality, these dif-
ferences are exacerbated by the fact that upper-income tax 
ﬁlers live in larger, more expensive homes and in areas with 
higher property taxes, and thus have larger deductions than 
those in lower tax brackets.
To accurately quantify the difference in tax beneﬁts across 
areas, this report ﬁrst examines Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) data on actual MID claims.  This data comes from a 
special release of the IRS ZIP code ﬁle in 2007, which reports 
the number of tax ﬁlers claiming the MID and the dollars 
deducted under the MID.  This data also contains informa-
tion on both adjusted gross and taxable income, allowing an 
estimate of marginal tax rates, so that a reasonably accurate 
measure of the actual tax savings can be calculated.
To summarize the combined beneﬁts of the major tax prefer-
ences for housing (MID, property tax deduction, and capital 
gains exclusion) we measure how they reduce the annual 
average cost of homeownership at the metropolitan area lev-
el.12  Following a long tradition of research in economics, we 
11. Tax policy experts often point out that under a pure Haig-Simons view of the 
income tax, a mortgage interest deduction is necessary to balance owner-occupied 
net beneﬁts with landlord net beneﬁts for housing.  This is because in a Haig-Simons 
income tax, the imputed rent— or value that owner occupiers get from living in their 
house and not actually paying rent— would be counted as income.  Because imputed 
rent is not taxed, and the logistics behind accurately counting it as income seem 
intractable, we do not consider their treatment in this analysis.
12. We also incorporate the degree to which tax ﬁlers use housing tax expenditures, 
represent the annual cost of homeownership in a user cost 
framework.  This framework considers most of the major 
reoccurring costs associated with homeownership as a per-
centage of the purchase price.  The user cost model we use, 
without the preferential tax treatment for housing, is repre-
sented by the following equation:
A=(0r1 +(1–0)r2+m+d+ tp-???t))VH
Where  is the annual cost of owning a home and VH is the 
value of the home. 0 represents the share of the home that 
is debt ﬁnanced, and is the interest rate paid on that debt. 
The user cost model also considers that any portion of the 
home that is paid in equity (1–0), is subject to the oppor-
tunity cost at an interest rate, r2.  Also included are annual 
costs for maintenance (m) and depreciation (d), and prop-
erty taxes (tp).  Finally, the user cost model considers that 
housing markets are subject to general price inﬂation (or 
possible deﬂation), and that this is a beneﬁt to homeowners. 
Price inﬂation is measured in the ??parameter. This would be 
negative (and add to cost) if the local market has price deﬂa-
tion.  Notice that when housing is treated like other assets, 
the capital gain from price inﬂation is subject to tax at rate t .
Amending the user cost model to incorporate housing tax 
preferences, we eliminate the taxation of capital gains (price 
inﬂation), and insert deductions for both mortgage interest 
and property taxes at marginal tax rate t.  The user cost mod-
el with housing tax preferences is then:
A=((1–t)0r1+(1–0)r2+m+d+(1–t)tp-??VH
Where the parameters are the same as described above.  We 
incorporate local housing market data from the American 
Housing Survey on property taxes, debt ﬁnancing and self-
reported home values, combined with IRS data on marginal 
tax rates to examine how the annual costs of homeownership 
differ as a result of the tax code across metropolitan areas.13 
We take the results from the user cost model and apply them 
to each metropolitan area housing market to examine how 
the package of housing tax preferences inﬂuences the choice 
of how much housing to purchase.  To do this, we incorporate 
the ﬁndings in Hanson (2012) that estimates the sensitivity 
of housing size to tax-driven changes in the cost of hous-
ing.  Hanson (2012) ﬁnds that the primary function of hous-
ing tax preferences is to encourage the purchase of a larger 
home, and not to encourage renters to become owners.  We 
use these results, compared with actual data on home size 
distribution, to estimate how much larger homes are in met-
ropolitan areas because of housing tax preferences.
based on the fraction of tax ﬁlers that itemize deductions in each metropolitan 
area.  To do this, we calculate a weighted average annual cost for itemizers and non-
itemizers at the metropolitan area level.
13. We use a nationally representative mortgage interest rate of 4 percent, an oppor-
tunity cost of capital of 2 percent, annual maintenance rate of 2 percent and depre-
ciation rate of 1 percent across all metropolitan areas.
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